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The objective of the report is to investigate if there is a difference between the 
blue chip and red chip companies in The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong in making 
the financing choice. The results of previous studies have shown that listed 
companies in Hong Kong generally followed the pecking order, rather than the 
optimal target mix in financing decisions. They ranked the financing choice in the 
order of internal equity, debt and external equity. 
We attempt to study whether the red chip companies also follow the pecking 
order, and whether there are any differences from the blue chip companies, taking into 
consideration of the special characteristics and backgrounds of the red chip companies. 
This study has compared the patterns and trends of the debt / equity ratios of the red 
chip companies against those of the blue chip companies, and regression analysis is 
also used to test the order of financing choice. 
In our study, we found that the summary statistics of debt / equity ratios were not 
steady and quite disperse over the study period. On average, the red chip companies 
maintained a higher debt / equity ratio than the blue chip companies. However, there 
is no strong evidence showing that both the blue chip and red chip companies 
� maintain an optimal mix of capital structure. Although we did not find any significant 
statistical proof on the pecking order practice by the blue chip and red chip companies 
iii 
from the regression tests, we did find some evidences that both type of companies 
prefer to use internal equity and debts for financing. However, different period may 
have different preference in the choice of financing. The finding of higher proportion 
of red chip companies would use external equity as their first choice of financing 
means than the blue chip companies during our study period may suggest that China 
concept stock influence in 1996 to late 1997 encouraged the red chip companies to 
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In previous studies, the results have indicated that listed companies in Hong 
Kong generally followed the pecking order principle, rather than the optimal target 
mix in financing decision. The companies generally rank the financing choice in the 
order of internal equity, debt and external equity. 'Blue chip' companies, such as, the 
constituent stocks of Hang Seng Index, are most frequently chosen as samples because 
they are well accepted by investors and academics as representing stocks of the 
market. 
However, since 1993, there are more than 40 state-owned enterprises (H-shares 
companies) listed on The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong ("SEHK"). They are 
companies incorporated in China according to the local PRC companies law and are 
owned by the State Council through various departments or bureau. In addition, there 
are increasing number of China-related companies, either being controlled by 
mainland Chinese companies or are closely connected with Chinese concerns, in the 
market around 1997. These 'red chip' companies have many aspects that are different 
from the 'blue chip' companies counterpart in the market, but their influence as well 
as market capitalization are unavoidably increasing. The 'red chip' companies have a 
closer tie to the mainland and most of them has a high percentage of shareholding in 
the hands of mainland related entities with management transferred from the local 
, authorities. 'Blue chip' companies, on the other hand, are mainly owned by local 
families with family members as the management, although some 'blue chip' 
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companies are operated by professional managers. This report attempts to investigate 
whether there is any difference between the 'blue chip' and ‘red chip' companies on 
SEHK in making the financing decision taking into account of their different 
characteristics and backgrounds. 
The study has been carried out for the period from 1993 to 1998. 1993 is 
selected as it is the year in which the first H-share company was listed in Hong Kong. 
It was the first China incorporated company to raise funds through a stock market 
outside mainland China. In addition, a number of ’red chip’ companies came to Hong 
Kong through back door listing and capital injection during the period. And Hang 
Seng China Enterprises Index was established in the same year to measure the 
performance of the listed H-share companies. During the period, the degree of 
popularity of the 'red chip' companies were not constant and there were minor 
variations in the definition of the ‘red chip' companies, nevertheless investors still 
accepted that they formed an integral part of the stock market in Hong Kong. ‘Red 
chip' companies were most popular to the investors in late 1996 to late 1997 just 
before the Asia financial turmoil. 
The report identifies and compares certain patterns and trends of debt / equity 
ratios, and reveals the difference, if any, between the 'blue chip' and ‘red chip' 
companies in Hong Kong during the period from 1993 to 1998. Through the study of 
these patterns and trends, the report tries to analyze whether the 'red chip' companies 
have the same financing choice as the 'blue chip' companies which follows the 
� pecking order principle as set out in certain previous studies. 
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Statistical techniques of multiple regression are then conducted to test the 
application of the pecking order by the companies. We have examined the relative 
percentage change of certain measures to incremental change in fixed and other non-
current assets. Also we have assessed the impact on fixed and other non-current 
assets on the demand for a specific financing mean. 
"Blue Chip” Companies 
"Blue Chips" is usually a name associated with the large companies that have a 
consistent good record of profits, stable payment of dividends and good potential for 
further development, and are widely accepted by investors as the representing stocks 
of the market. 
In the Hong Kong stock market, Hang Seng Index ("HSI") is regarded as a 
barometer of the market. The HSI comprises 33 constituent stocks which accounts for 
more than 70% of the total market capitalization on SEHK. The criteria to be a 
constituent stock are mainly based on the followings: 
1. the market capitalization and turnover rankings of the companies; 
2. the financial performance of the companies; and 
3. the representation of the sub-sector within the HSI directly reflecting that of the 
market. 
In this study, we use the 33 constituent stocks of HSI as the representation of the 
‘ blue chip companies. 
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“Red Chip” Companies 
"Red Chips" is a specific name used to refer to listed companies on SEHK which 
are either directly or indirectly controlled by mainland China, or closely connected 
with Chinese concerns. The red chip companies frequently have the support of strong 
and resourceful parents from mainland China as they are mostly related to either 
provincial or municipal authorities, or owned by the State, with access to good quality 
assets and connection network. Although there are differences in various areas 
between those China-affiliated companies and those China incorporated State-owned 
enterprises, investors commonly believed that both these red chip companies are best 
placed to capitalize on China's booming economy with a potential of injecting those 
good quality assets into the red chip companies and are one of the most convenient 
channels to make investment to China through Hong Kong. However, these 
companies are also the companies in the market that are most affected by the various 
China factors such as the transparency problem, system differences and exchange 
controls. 
In the Hong Kong stock market, there are 2 indices which are used to measure 
the stock price performance of these red chip companies. They are namely the Hang 
Seng China-Affiliated Corporations Index (HSCCI) and the Hang Seng China 
Enterprises Index (HSCEI). 
HSCCI reflects the stock price performance of listed companies with significant 
equity controlled by entities in mainland China. The criteria for selection as 
constituent stocks are: 
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1. at least 35% shareholding directly held by either mainland entities which are 
defined to include state-owned organizations, provincial or municipal 
authorities in mainland China or listed or privately owned Hong Kong 
companies which are controlled by the former; and 
2. the company must not be a constituent stock of the HSCEI. 
‘ HSCEI includes all the H-shares companies listed on SEHK. That is, all the 
listed companies in Hong Kong which are incorporated in mainland China according 
to the PRC companies law and owned by the State Council through various 
departments, collectively called H-shares companies, are included in HSCEI. 
In this study, the constituent stocks of both the HSCCI and HSCEI are used to 
represent the red chip companies. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next chapter conducts a 
literature review of the basic financial principles, theories and their empirical tests. 
Chapter III describes the basic methodology and the sample firm statistics. Results 
and analysis on the studied subjects are conducted in Chapter IV with conclusion 




Optimal Capital Structure 
It was the classic paper of Modigliani and Miller (1958) that started the modem 
theory of corporate finance. The classic paper shows that, under certain restrictive 
assumptions on the conditions of a perfect capital market, the capital structure of a 
company is irrelevant to its value, under certain restrictive assumptions on the 
conditions of a perfect capital market. Since then, a great number of financial 
academics have studied and further investigated the implication of relaxing the 
restrictive assumptions on companies' behavior in decisions pertaining the capital 
structure. These later studies on capital structure by relaxing the restrictive 
assumptions on companies' behavior have contributed to the understanding of 
companies' behavior and indicated that capital structure does matter. 
In another classic paper, Modigliani and Miller (1963) further state that the level 
of a company's leverage at which its marginal cost of bankruptcy is just offset by its 
marginal tax shield defines the optimal capital structure of the company. The 
introduction of bankruptcy (or financial distress) costs into the tax models leads to 
such conclusion. It is argued that bankruptcy costs are a positive function of leverage. 
Thus on one hand an increase in leverage will lead to gains from saving in corporate 
taxes while on the other hand the likelihood of bankruptcy and other financial distress 
will increase when leverage increases. As a result, when marginal costs (financial 
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distress) of debt is equal to the marginal benefit (tax savings), there exists a leverage 
ratio which is the optimal capital structure of the company that maximize its value. 
In subsequent studies, Bradley, Jarrell and Jim (1984) agree with the tax-based 
models of capital structure and the previous findings of other studies. Masulis (1988) 
summarizes the results of previous empirical studies and further supports the theory. 
It has been argued that the theory based on balancing the benefits (tax savings) 
and costs (financial distress) of debts is seriously incomplete since it implies that 
without a possible tax savings together with a positive financial distress costs, debt 
would never be a rational choice of financing. However, debt was commonly used 
prior to the existence of tax subsidies on interest payments in the modem business 
world. Jensen and Meckling (1976) explained the issue with the agency theory and 
initiated the significant developments in the research of the agency theory in the past 
two decades. With the concept of agency costs, it is proved that even with an absence 
of tax benefit, certain amount of debts would still exist in a company if the marginal 
agency costs of outside equity is higher than the marginal agency costs of debt. 
The theory explains that there is an agency relationship between the owner (the 
principal) and the manager (the agent). However, the separation between ownership 
and management in modem companies gives rise to conflicts between owner manager 
and outsider shareholders. Thus company's resources may not be managed in an 
optimal way which would maximize company value, or a "residual loss" as referred to 
» 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976) may incur. The value of the company is maximized 
when total agency costs of debt and external equity are minimized. To minimize the 
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total agency costs, managers will issue both debt and equity. Hence company's unique 
optimal capital structure involves a balance of debt and equity, even though no taxes 
are assumed to exist. It is in line with the study of Titman and Wessels (1988) that 
transaction costs may be an important determinant of capital structure choice. 
All capital structure models based on tax, financial distress and agency costs 
會 
indicate to the existence of an optimal capital structure determined by equating 
benefits (tax savings) and costs of debt (financial distress and agency costs). Such 
models are called static trade-off models. The models overall provide implications 
that higher-risk companies should borrow less than lower-risk companies when other 
things being equal; and companies with more tangible and marketable assets would 
borrow more than companies whose value are derived primarily from intangible assets. 
Pecking Order Theory 
On the other hand, a different line of research has emerged over the past decades. 
This new branch of literature began with the research of Myers and Majluf (1984) and 
Myers (1984). Contrary to the arguments of optimal capital structure, they find that 
there is an order in which the company will follow in making financing choice, the 
"pecking order". 
Myers and Majluf (1984) develope an equilibrium model under the conditions 
that managers know more about the company's true value than potential investors. 
� Assuming that a currently undervalued company needs to raise funds to undertake a 
valuable investment opportunity, the model shows that in certain circumstances, the 
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company may avoid issuing new external equity since the under-valuation of its 
equity is so severe that the loss of existing shareholders from the dilution of 
ownership is greater than the gains from investing in the profitable project. Thus 
debts will be issued to generate the required funds. So a company would only issue 
new shares when its shares are overpriced. However, with this understanding, 
investors will refuse to buy the overpriced new equity, they will mark down the price 
of such overpriced new equity unless the company has exhausted its debt capacity, 
that is the company has so much debt that it would face substantial additional costs in 
issuing more. Therefore investors will effectively force the company to follow a 
pecking order, that is, use debt financing prior to external equity, until its borrowing 
capacity is exhausted. 
On that basis, the following corporate finance trends arise. Firstly, it is generally 
better to issue safe securities than risky ones, that is external financing using debt is 
better than financing by equity. Secondly, there is a tendency to rely on internal 
sources of funds, as managers avoid issuing undervalued securities by financing first 
with internal equity and then with external claims that are least likely to be mispriced. 
The models are consistent with Donaldson's (1961) findings which predict that 
companies prefer internal equity first followed by external debts and then external 
equities in financing. Donaldson (1961) finds that there is managerial preferences in 
raising funds that appear to reflect the cost difference, that is internal funds are 
cheaper than external funds and equity securities are more expensive to sell than debt 
, securities. In the study of Myers and Majluf (1984), they also conclude that internal 
funds are less costly than external funds and will be more preferable by companies. It 
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implies that an interdependence between investments and financing decisions is 
induced. 
As such, this line of research gives rise to a competing theory in contrast to the 
mainstream theory of corporate finance that suggests the existence of optimal capital 
structure for companies. Myers (1984) argues that the existence of information 
asymmetry as to equity and the corporate desire for ensuring sufficient funds available 
for financing necessary investments have led to companies first to prefer internal 
equity to debt, debt to outside equity, in other words, following a pecking order in 
financing. Thus the higher the degree of information asymmetry, the more likely that 
pecking order theory will be observed. It is different from the homogeneous 
information assumed in the static trade-off models. 
Although the results of various studies are considered as a mix, there is an 
increasing number of studies supporting with the pecking order theory. With a survey 
of 176 U.S. companies' managers about the financing decisions, Pinegar and 
Wilbricht (1989) conclude that managers of their sample companies are more likely to 
follow a financing hierarchy than to maintain a target debt-equity mix. In addition, 
Baskin (1989), after an empirical investigation, concludes that the static optimal 
capital structure appears to have little power in explaining companies' behavior but on 
the other hand, there is accumulated evidence which is in favor of the pecking order. 
Baskin (1989) argues that the theory of static optimal capital structure is deductively 
derived from basic axioms, which in particular, ignores the material role of 
‘ asymmetric information. 
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However, Helwege and Liang (1996) conduct a study which resulted in a 
negative evidence against the pecking order theory. They examined the financing 
decisions of a sample of newly listed companies in the U.S. market during the decade 
following their initial public offerings ("IPO") in 1983. There is little evidence in 
support of the pecking order in decision to obtain external financing and results did 
not indicate that companies strongly avoid external financing as predicted by the 
pecking order theory. 
Study on Capital Structure of Hong Kong Companies 
In Hong Kong, only few academic research has focused on Hong Kong corporate 
finance. Ip and Hopewell (1987) investigated the financial structures of companies in 
Hong Kong and documented an increasing trend in corporate debt ratios for Hong 
Kong listed companies during the period between 1970 and 1984 although the upward 
trend was affected during the recession periods. They suggest that business risk has a 
significant impact on Hong Kong companies' choice of financing mix which is 
consistent with the theory of optimal capital structure, stating that business risk does 
affect the financing choice. 
On the other hand, Fan, Cheung, Leung and Wong (1995) conducted a survey on 
Hong Kong listed companies in 1995 to study the capital structure decisions of Hong 
Kong listed companies. The survey was carried out in the same way as that of Pinegar 
and Wilbricht (1989) and similar results was found. The majority of the companies 
> conformed more to the pecking order theory than maintaining a long term capital 
optimal mix in making capital structure decisions. The order preferred by the 
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managers are consistent with the previous studies. Retained earnings (that is, internal 
equity) is the most preferred source of funding, followed by straight debt, external 
(new) common equity and lastly convertible debt. 
However, one special feature of the Hong Kong market is that there is effectively 
no personal tax on debt and equity income. So the existence of corporate tax shield 
(that is the tax savings benefit) may favor debt financing in Hong Kong and yet as Ip 
and Hopewell (1987) reported in their study that the long-term debt ratio has 
maintained at remarkably low levels. This may be due to another special feature of 
the Hong Kong capital market, the debt market is relatively immature in Hong Kong 
for raising funds. As a part of the capital market, the debt (or bonds) market plays a 
less important role compared to the stock market which is more mature with a longer 
history. The debt market was virtually unknown to the investors until recently in early 
1990s when the Hong Kong Government issued the Exchange Fund Bill, which 
provided the reference interest rate as the risk-free rate for the first time in Hong Kong. 
Although the debt market is expanding, there are only a few Hong Kong companies 
have issued corporate bonds domestically. The investors in Hong Kong, even the 
institutions, do not have a long term investment perspective as in overseas markets. 
Accordingly companies may prefer to raise their funds with equity. 
Undoubtedly, there are many areas in corporate finance for Hong Kong 
companies awaiting for investigation and further studies. The major objective of our 
present study is to investigate to what extend Hong Kong companies would behave 
% 
according to the pecking order developed by academics in making financing decisions, 
focusing on the red chip companies. 
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CHAPTER III 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The focus of this study is to compare the financing choice of the blue chip and 
the red chip companies on SEHK. Listed companies under the HSI are used as 
representation of the blue chip companies as they usually have a consistent record of 
profits, stable payment of dividends and good potential for future developments, and 
are well accepted by investors and academics as representing stocks of the market. 
Whereas those under the HSCEI and HSCCI are selected as representation of the red 
chip companies as both the China-affiliated companies and China incorporated State-
owned enterprises are believed to be the most appropriate channels to invest in China 
through Hong Kong and to share the economic boom in China. 
We have selected the companies based on the constituent stocks of the above 
indices listed at 31 December for the years from 1993 to 1998 according to the 
information provided by the Hang Seng Index Services Limited. Companies which 
are not the constituent stock of the relevant indices as at 31 December 1998 are 
excluded from our samples. Moreover, listed companies under the finance category 
are excluded as their financing needs and mechanisms are substantially different from 
the other companies and are beyond our scope of study in this paper. Among the 
sample companies, three listed companies are overlapped in the HSI and HSCCI. In 
view of the immaterial impact, we have not excluded these companies from both 
‘ indices. (A detailed list of the sample companies selected from the constituent stocks 
of the indices are included in Appendix I to III). 
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The data used for analysis include the financial data of the listed companies of 
the above three indices during the period from 1993 to 1998. Financial data have 
been obtained from the annual reports of those listed companies for the relevant 
calendar year. 
•• 
The testing is conducted under two areas: 
A. Pattern and trend of debt / equity ratios 
We compare the pattern and trend of the debt / equity ratios of the blue chip and 
the red chip companies for the period from 1993 to 1998 by using the summary 
statistics - minimum, maximum, mean, median and standard deviation and assess 
whether they follow a pecking order. 
The following definition of debt / equity ratio is used for calculation: 
Debt / equity ratio = total liabilities / shareholders' fund 
B. Empirical test on the pecking order principle 
We test the pecking order application by examining the relative increase in 
internal equity, debts and external equity as a percentage of increase in fixed and other 
non-current assets, and also performing multiple regression to examine their 
relationships. 
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We calculate the various incremental values of the financing means individually 
as a percentage of incremental value of fixed and other non-current assets and the 
formula for calculation is: 
Increase in A as a % of 
increase in fixed and = (A, - A,., / TA, - TA .^,) x 100% 
other non-current assets 
where A = internal equity, debts or external equity 
TA = fixed and other non-current assets 
t, t-1 = balance at a particular year and the year before 
Increase in fixed and other non-current assets is defined as proxy of the funding 
demand which will be in turn financed by various means, i.e. internal equity, debts or 
external equity. Internal equity is defined as retained earnings while debts is defined 
as total liabilities. External equity is proxy by paid-up share capital. 
Besides, we also perform multiple regression to assess the impact of incremental 
change in fixed and other non-current assets on the demand for a specific financing 
mean and the relationship between different financing means. Three regression 
models are conducted. 
TE = a + b(TA) + c(IE) (1) 
D = a + b(TA) + c(IE) +d(EE) (2) 
EE = a + b(TA) + c(IE) + d(D) (3) 
where D = increase in debts 
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IE = increase in internal equity 
EE = increase in external equity 
TE = increase in total external financing 
(i.e. debts and external equity) 




RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
Pattern and Trend of Debt / Equity Ratios 
The summary statistics of debt / equity ratios of the blue chip and red chip 
companies are presented in Table 1 and 2 respectively. For the blue chip companies, 
the average debt / equity ratios ranged from 58.63% to 73.05% during the years from 
1993 to 1998. The average debt / equity ratio was not quite steady within the period 
and fluctuated within a wide band of 14.42% together with the material fluctuation in 
the standard deviation from 38.08% to 75.89% among these years. However, it 
indicated that there is a slightly increasing trend of average debt / equity ratio starting 
from 1995 to 1998. 
Table 1 
Debt / Equity Ratio of the Blue Chip Companies in Hong Kong 
for the Period from 1993 to 1998 
� I im\ i M ~ � 
Average 73.05% ^ 7 1 . 3 8 % 62.14% 59.53% 62.54% 58.63% 
Minimum 1 4 . 4 8 % 1 0 . 8 2 % 9.30% ^ 1 5 . 8 1 % 1 0 . 0 9 % 1 3 . 4 2 % 
Maximum 309.88% 340.47% 269.71% 175.21% 218.40% 213.17% 
Median 60.25% 45.71% 52.60% 50.03% 56.42% ^^43.98% 
Standard deviation 6 4 . 5 7 % 7 5 . 8 9 % ^ ^ 5 7 . 4 0 % ^ 3 8 . 0 8 % 44.35% 44.33% 
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For the red chip companies, the fluctuation of average debt / equity ratio was 
within the band of 19.04% with the lowest of 91.24% in 1997 and the highest of 
110.28% in 1996. Besides, the difference of standard deviation between years was 
even wider as compared with the blue chip companies, ranging from 60.45% to 
165.06%. The negative minimum debt / equity ratio in 1998 is due to the result of 
shareholders' fund deficit of Guangnan (Holdings) Ltd which can be regarded as a 
special case. If the debt / equity ratio of this company is excluded in 1998，the 
minimum debt / equity ratio is 1.71%. There was an increasing trend of average debt / 
equity ratio from 1993 to 1996，but it is experienced a sudden fall in 1997 and a 
rebound in 1998. This phenomenon is different with that of the blue chip companies. 
In late 1993，the PRC government implemented an austerity policy to cool down 
the overheated economy which made companies difficult to get funds from central 
government or borrow locally in China. Thus, it enhanced the companies' needs of 
raising funds outside mainland China, either in Hong Kong or overseas. Besides, red 
chip companies with the assistance of its mainland owner, may have a better exposure 
internationally, thus can relatively easier to raise fund through the overseas debt 
markets than the blue chip companies, given the local debt market is immature. All 
these did facilitate or encourage the red chip companies to borrow more and perhaps 
explain the increasing trend in debt / equity ratio of the red chip companies from 1993 
to 1996. However, the popularity of the red chip companies reached its climax when 
the idea of China concept stock was highly appreciated and accepted by investors in 
Hong Kong and overseas in early 1997. The trading volume of the shares of the red 
� chip companies reached their record high together with the HSCEI and HSCCI in mid 
1997. This may make the red chip companies to switch their preferences to equity 
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financing as it is relatively more cost efficient and easier for arranging equity 
financing. Furthermore, with the breakout of financial problem of a number of red 
chip companies shortly after the financial crisis in late 1997, it accelerated the 
decrease of debt / equity ratio until its rebound in 1998. 
Table 2 
Debt / Equity Ratio of the Red Chip Companies in Hong Kong 
for the Period from 1993 to 1998 
i M ] m i ] m i 
Average 101.63% 91.24% 110.28% 107.80% 104.26% 102.77% 
Minimum -357.78% 4.68% ^ 7 . 1 3 % ^ 1 5 . 4 1 % 18.23% 6.54% 
Maximum 1,302.92% 384.01% 594.81% 359.62% 452.54% 319.49% 
Median 67.85% 6 0 . 4 5 % 7 1 . 5 7 % 9 1 . 9 2 % 8 7 . 3 7 % 76.50% 
Standard deviation ^165.06% 60.45% 106.81% 74.14% 83.35% 83.86% 
As compared the statistical results of the blue chip and red chip companies set 
out above, different picture is found. Since the 1980s and the period of Deng 
Ziaoping's regime, China has undergone a number of economic periods. The biggest 
engines of economic growth during the 1980s have been the export-oriented coastal 
regions and the special economic zones. The growth was not driven by many macro-
economic tools, but somehow it was influenced by the real political tools e.g. state 
funding control, austerity measures and also political crackdown. Although starting 
from 1990s, China has changed its way in economic policy by using more macro-
economic methods, there is still uncertainty of its political stability. Besides, the 
� foreign exchange is still under strict control by the Chinese government, companies 
are not easy to remit money out of China. Accounting system, taxation and 
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investment policies are also refining in order to cope with increasing openness of 
Chinese economy, frequent changes are expected. All these environmental factors 
have made the red chip companies facing a more volatile external environment and 
higher business and operating risk than the blue chip companies. According to the 
implication of optimal capital structure, higher risk companies should borrow less 
than lower risk companies. However, the results show that the red chip companies 
maintained a higher debt / equity ratio than the blue chip companies which seems 
contradictory to the optimal capital structure theory. 
On the other hand, the pecking order is established on the basis that the problem 
of asymmetric information does force a company to follow the sequence of the 
pecking order and thus companies which are associated with more asymmetric 
information should seek debt financing rather than equity. Most of the red chip 
companies are owned by China's leading ministries, the State Council and provincial 
and municipal authorities before their listing, companies' information disclosure 
requirements are less comprehensive in China. Moreover, majority of the 
management of the red chip companies are controlled by the officials of the Chinese 
authorities, they are not used to manage the company in achieving objectives as the 
same way as listed company. Besides, those officials are representatives from 
different organizations, State Council, provincial and municipal authorities, they may 
have different management perspectives and beliefs. Such that, they may have to 
consider the interests of their own representing parties or political interests in making 
decision for the companies, and thus companies' interest may be overlooked. 
‘ Transparency of companies information is limited and there seems to have larger 
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existence of asymmetric information in these companies which should drive them to 
use more debt financing as according to the pecking order theory. 
From the above tables, the debt / equity ratios on average for the red chip 
companies are higher than that of the blue chip companies which shows some 
indication that pecking order may have been followed. However, we cannot quickly 
draw the conclusion that the pecking order has been followed in explaining the 
financing behaviors in our samples. Other factors like companies' size are also 
considered to have impact on the financing choice. Larger companies are able to raise 
debt at lower costs due to their lower probability of bankruptcy and lower degree of 
information asymmetry. Higher likelihood of profit generation by larger companies to 
cover the interest cost also encourage them to borrow more. In addition, the public 
debt markets in Hong Kong are at an infancy stage and far not mature enough to 
accommodate a lot of fund raising activities as compared with countries like the 
United States. And only a few large companies in Hong Kong have international 
exposure which are capable to raise fund from overseas debt market, not to mention 
the middle size companies. So most of the companies in Hong Kong may have limited 
choice of debt financing, mostly in short-term. As a result, the lack of complete choice 
of debt financing may have forced the local listed companies to rely more heavily on 
other types of external financing such as bank borrowings and equity. 
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Figure 1 
Average Debt / Equity Ratio of the Blue Chip and Red Chip Companies 
for the Period from 1993 to 1998 
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Empirical Test of Pecking Order Applications 
in Hong Kong 
We postulate that if pecking order is true and there is an increase in fixed and 
other non-current assets, the relative increase in internal equity, debts and external 
equity as a percentage of the increase in fixed and other non-current assets may reflect 
, a pecking order, showing the increase in internal equity is more than the increase in 
debts which is in turn more than the increase in external equity. 
Blue Chip Companies 
Table 3 summarizes the results of the incremental change in different financing 
means as a percentage of increase in fixed and other non-current assets for the blue 
chip companies. Increases in these three financing means, on average, have a positive 
relationship with the increase in fixed and other non-current assets. The average 
incremental percentage of internal equity, debts and external equity are 113.24%, 
30.72% and 9.37%. This, in general, indicates that internal equity is the most 
preferred one among the three and external equity being the least preferred one. It 
also indicates that the fund raised from internal equity may not be just for the 
financing of increase in fixed and other non-current assets as it has a percentage over 
100%. 
We also did a tabulation to assess the order of increases (as a percentage of the 
increase in fixed and other non-current assets) in internal equity, debts and external 
equity. As revealed in Part II of Table 3’ the most popular order in our study which 
has 45 counts of cases in our sample companies is that debts is greater than or equal to 
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the internal equity which is in turn greater than or equal to external equity. While 
there are only 20 counts of cases that follow the sequence of pecking order, that is 
internal equity is greater than or equal to debts which is in turn greater than or equal to 
external equity. But undoubtedly, the external equity is the least preferred financing 
mean as there are only 4 cases that in the order with external equity being the first 
choice. 
Part III of Table 3 also presents three cases of regression. The first case uses the 
increase in total external finance (i.e. debts plus external equity) as dependent variable 
while increase in fixed and other non-current assets and internal equity are the 
independent variables. The regression result confirms the positive relationship 
between the increase in fixed and other non-current assets and external finance. The 
coefficient of increase in fixed and other non-current assets is 0.5416 and the t-
statistics is at 4.7923 which is significant at 5% level. By holding the variable of 
increase in fixed and other non-current assets being constant, there is a negative 
relationship between external finance and internal equity with coefficient of -0.5605 
but t-statistics is insignificant. Overall, however, R Square is only 20.13% meaning 
the explanatory power of this regression is not strong. 
The second case uses the increase in debts as the dependent variable, while the 
independent variables are increase in fixed and other non-current assets, internal 
equity and external equity. Still, there is positive relationship between the increase in 
debts and fixed and other non-current assets with coefficient of 0.5582 and t-statistics 
� of 4.9047. Internal equity indicates a negative relationship with debts. The 
coefficient of internal equity is -0.5999 but the t-statistics shows insignificancy (t-
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statistics equals to -1.5576). External equity indicates a positive relationship with 
debts and the coefficient is 1.3604. However, the t-statistics is insignificant at 5% 
level and R Square is only 21.05%, meaning a poor explanatory power. 
The third case uses the increase in external equity as dependent variable. The 
independent variables are the increase in fixed and other non-current assets, internal 
equity and debts. The relationship between external equity and fixed and other non-
current assets is confirmed negative while the relationship between external equity 
and internal equity and also the total debts are confirmed positive. However, the 
value of coefficient for all three variables are low and they are statistically 
insignificant. Besides, the R Square has a very weak explanatory power at 2.3%. 
To sum up the findings on the financing choice of the blue chip companies, it 
indicates that there is an order of internal equity, debts and external equity by using 
the average percentage of incremental value of these three means as a percentage of 
increase in fixed and other non-current assets. However, a different picture is found 
by counting on the actual cases on the order of increases (as a percentage of increase 
in fixed and other non-current assets) in internal equity, debts and external equity. 
The most popular order is found to be debts, internal equity and external equity. 
Although the explanatory power of the three regression cases are not strong, it still 
sheds some lights on the financing policy of the blue chip companies that the external 
equity is the least preferred one. It also indicates that there must be some other factors, 
such as the dividend policy, interest rate, capital market conditions and company size 
‘ that need to be considered or included in the regression to provide a better explanation 
for the choice of financing. 
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Table 3 
The Relationships between Increments in Fixed and Other Non-current Assets， 
Internal Equity, Debts and External Equity of the Blue Chip Companies 
Part I ； As % of increase in fixed and other non-cwrrent assets 
Increase in fixed 
and other non- Internal External 
current assets Debts ("D") Equity ("IE") Equity ("EE") 
No. of counts 95 95 95 95 
HK$’000 
Average 7,206,848 30.72% 113.24% 9.37% 
Minimum 9,300 -5120.43% -62.31% -46.19% 
Maximum 47,072,000 2438.23% 4874.19% 473.12% 
Median 4,152,000 45.37% 28.53% 0.01% 
Part II : The relative increments of debts, internal equity and external equity 
IE>=D>=EE IE>=EE>=D D>=IE>=EE 
No. of counts 20 19 45 
D>=EE>=IE EE>=D>=IE EE>=IE>=D 
No. of counts 8 0 4 
I 
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Table 3 (continued) 
The Relationships between Increments in Fixed and Other Non-current Assets, 
Internal Equity, Debts and External Equity of the Blue Chip Companies 
Part III: Summary of regression results 
Y Variable External finance Debts External equity 
X Variables (i) Fixed & other (i) Fixed & other (i) Fixed & other 
non-current assets non-current assets Non-current assets 
(ii) Internal equity (ii) Internal equity (ii) Internal equity 
(iii) External equity (iii) Debts 
Observations 95 95 95 
Coefficient 
Fixed & other non-current assets 0.5416 0.5582 -0.0089 
Internal equity -0.5605 -0.5999 0.0186 
External equity N/A 1.3604 N/A 
Debts N/A N/A 0.0034 
t-statistics 
Fixed & other non-current assets 4.7923 4.9047 -1.4111 
Internal equity -1.4593 -1.5576 0.9633 
External equity N/A 0.6483 N/A 
Debts N/A N/A 0.6483 
Significance 5% 
Fixed & other non-current assets Yes Yes No 
Internal equity No No No 
External equity N/A No N/A 
Debts N/A N/A No 
R Square 20.13% 21.05% 2.30% 
� 
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Red Chip Companies 
The above tests done for the blue chip companies are repeated for the red chip 
companies to see whether there is any difference in their financing choice. Results 
are summarized in Table 4. On average, debts has a negative relationship with the 
increase in fixed and other non-current assets with -210.84%. While the other two 
means of financing, internal equity and external equity have a positive relationship. 
The average incremental percentage of internal equity and external equity are 
171.64% and 59.99%. This reflects that internal equity is the most preferred one 
among the three and debts being the least preferred one. Similar to the result of the 
blue chip companies, the percentage for increase in internal equity as a percentage of 
increase in fixed and other non-current assets is over 100% indicating that fund raised 
from internal equity may be used for other purposes other than the financing of 
increase in fixed and other non-current assets. 
For the second part of ranking the order of increases (as a percentage in the 
increase in fixed and other non-current assets) in internal equity, debts and external 
equity, a similar picture was found for the red chip companies as the blue chip 
companies. As revealed in Part II of Table 4, there are 72 cases in which debts is 
greater than or equal to the internal equity which is in turn greater than or equal to 
external equity, that has the highest frequency in our study. While there are only 14 
counts of cases showing the sequence of pecking order in which internal equity is 
greater than or equal to debts which is in turn greater than or equal to external equity. 
Table 4 also presents the results of three cases of regression. The regression 
result of the first case, with external finance being the dependent variable and increase 
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in fixed and other non-current assets and internal equity being the independent 
variables, confirms the positive relationship between the increase in fixed and other 
non-current assets and external finance. The coefficient of increase in fixed and other 
non-current assets is 0.5885 and the t-statistics is at 13.1603 which is significant at 5% 
level. By holding the variable of increase in fixed and other non-current assets being 
constant, there is a negative relationship between external finance and internal equity 
with coefficient of -0.2404 and the t-statistics is insignificant. Overall, R Square is 
51.6% meaning the explanatory power of this regression is strong. 
The second case uses the increase in debts as the dependent variable, while the 
independent variables are fixed and other non-current assets, internal equity and 
external equity. Still, there is positive relationship between the increase in debts and 
fixed and other non-current assets with coefficient of 0.5726 and t-statistics of 
13.0776. Internal equity indicates a negative relationship with debts with coefficient 
of -0.2756 but the t-statistics is insignificant (t-statistics equal to -1.1788). External 
equity indicates a negative relationship with debts but the coefficient is low and the t-
statistics is insignificant at 5% level. R Square is 51.35% indicating a strong 
explanatory power. 
The third case uses the increase in external equity as dependent variable. The 
independent variables are the increase in fixed and other non-current assets, internal 
equity and debts. External equity has a positive relationship with both fixed and other 
non-current assets and internal equity, but has a negative relationship with debts. 
‘ However, the value of coefficient for all three variables are low and they are 
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statistically insignificant. Besides, the R Square is also low at 2.17% with very 
limited explanatory power. 
To summarize the findings on the financing choice of the red chip companies, it 
is indicated that there is an order of internal equity, debts and external equity by using 
the average percentage of incremental value of these three means as a percentage of 
increase in fixed and other non-current assets. However, a different picture is found 
by counting on the actual cases on the order of increases (as a percentage of increase 
in fixed and other non-current assets) in these three means. The most popular order is 
found to be debts, internal equity and external equity. 
As compared the result of the blue chip and red chip companies, we found that 
basically both types of companies prefer to use internal equity and debts for financing. 
However, higher proportion of the red chip companies would use external equity as 
their first priority of financing means than the blue chip companies. This may due to 
the fact that the red chip companies usually have a relatively higher percentage of 
shareholding being held by controlling entities, thus are more willing to be diluted in 
equity financing. Moreover, with the increased understanding and acceptability from 
foreign investors, they may intend to increase the availability and liquidity of their 
shares in the market by issuing more shares through equity financing. While on the 
other hand, most blue chip companies are family owned with shareholding of around 
35 percent to 50 percent, thus they are more reluctant to be diluted in financing by 
equity. Moreover, during the period of 1996 and 1997 before the financial crises, 
‘ investors were optimistic about the growth of China market, which in turn led to a 
buying frenzy of China concept stock. In this connection, investors were even willing 
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to buy overpriced stock at such a favorable blooming market conditions and thus 
relatively external equity became a more frequently used financing means by the red 




The Relationships between Increments in Fixed and Other Non-current Assets, 
Internal Equity, Debts and External Equity of the Red Chip Companies 
Part I : As % of increase in fixed and other non-current assets 
Increase in fixed 
and other non- Internal External 
current assets Debts ("D") equity ("IE") equity ("EE") 
No. of counts 189 189 189 189 
HKS'OOO 
Average 691,314 -210.84% 171.64% 59.99% 
Minimum 277 -47032.31% -20.07% -806.77% 
Maximum 6,017,470 1117.09% 17711.42% 8407.86% 
Median 322,743 51.18% 1.24% 10.17% 
Part II ； The relative increments of debts, internal gqttity and external gquity 
IE>=D>=EE IE>=EE>=D D>=IE>=EE 
No. of counts 14 30 72 
D�=EE>=IE EE>=D>=IE EE>=IE>=D 
No. of counts 43 8 22 
1 
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Table 4 (continued) 
The Relationships between Increments in Fixed and Other Non-current Assets, 
Internal Equity, Debts and External Equity of the Red Chip Companies 
Part III: Summary of regression results 
Y Variable External finance Debts External equity 
X Variables (i) Fixed & other (i) Fixed & other (i) Fixed & other 
non-current assets Non-current assets non-current assets 
(ii) Internal equity (ii) Internal equity (ii) Internal equity 
(iii) External equity (iii) Debts 
Observations 189 189 189 
Coefficient 
Fixed & other non-current assets 0.5885 0.5726 0.0201 
Internal equity -0.2402 -0.2756 0.0368 
External equity N/A -0.0734 N/A 
Debts N/A N/A -0.0052 
t-statistics 
Fixed & other non-current assets 13.1603 13.0776 1.2481 
Internal equity -1.0010 -1.1788 0.5882 
External equity N/A -0.2660 N/A 
Debts N/A N/A -0.2660 
Significance 5% 
Fixed & other non-current assets Yes Yes No 
Internal equity No No No 
External equity N/A No N/A 
Debts N/A N/A No 





Our summary statistics on debt / equity ratio indicates on average that the blue 
chip and the red chip companies did not maintain a steady percentage and with high 
dispersion over the period from 1993 to 1998. While the average debt / equity ratio of 
the red chip companies are higher than the blue chip companies, it may be attributed 
by the larger existence of asymmetric information of the red chip companies than the 
blue chip companies. However, due to limited time, we did not carry out any further 
test to verify the relationship between the degree of information asymmetry and usage 
of debts. 
We also performed regressions to find out the relationship between the increase 
in fixed and other non-current assets with the financing means of internal equity, debts 
and external equity. However, the regression results do not provide any strong 
evidence for supporting or refuting whether the pecking order is followed by the blue 
chip and red chip companies. 
Although we could not statistically prove or refute the pecking order theory and 
static trade-off model based on our empirical data, we believe that our study at least 
sheds some lights on certain factual aspects of the capital structure of the blue chip 
and red chip companies. Our findings may suggest that either of the static trade-off 
‘ model or the pecking order theory can only provide partial explanation for the 
companies' behavior on capital choice. Neither in theory nor in practice are there 
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simple norms or guidelines for a financing decision. In reality, the following factors 
also affect the managers of a company in making their financing choice: 
• Corporate environmental factors such as corporate and personal tax, 
bankruptcy costs, agency cost, managerial compensation, distribution of 
ownership and voting rights, flotation costs and government regulations; 
• Debt securities market in Hong Kong is at an infancy stage. As such, the 
debt securities may not be viewed as a common alternative for the investors. 
This immature environment will certainly limit the financing choice of the 
companies especially when comparing to the companies in other markets, 
like the United States; and 
• The differences of economic and political environment of China and Hong 
Kong may also affect the companies' behavior in financing choice. 
In order to formulate a financing policy which is most appropriate to a company, 
corporate experience and insights have to be capitalized with due consideration to the 
internal needs and market condition. 
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APPENDIX III 
SAMPLE COMPANIES SELECTED FROM THE HANG SENG INDEX CONSTITUENT STOCKS 
\m mi mft mA im 
Amoy Properties Ltd. x x x x x 
Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd. x x x x x x 
Cheung Kong (Holdings) Ltd. x x x x x x 
Cheung Kong Infrastructure Holdings Ltd. x x 
China Light & Power Co. Ltd. x x x x x x 
China Resources Enterprises Ltd. x x 
China Telecom (Hong Kong) Ltd. x 
CITIC Pacific Ltd. x x x x x x 
Great Eagle Holdings Ltd. x x x x x x 
Guangdong Investment Ltd. x x x x x x 
Hang Lung Development Co. Ltd. x x x x x x 
Henderson Investment Ltd. x x x 
Henderson Land Development Ltd. x x x x x x 
Hong Kong & China Gas Co. Ltd. x x x x x x 
Hong Kong Electric (Holdings) Ltd. x x x x x x 
Hong Kong Telecommunication Ltd. x x x x x x 
The Hongkong and Shanghai Hotels, Ltd. x x x x x x 
Hopewell Holdings Ltd. x x x x x x 
Hutchison Whampoa Ltd. x x x x x x 
Hysan Development Co. Ltd. x x x x x x 
New World Development Co. Ltd. x x x x x x 
Shanghai Industrial Holdings Ltd. x 
Shangri-La Asia Ltd. x x x x 
Sino Land Co. Ltd. x x x x 
Sun Hung Kai Properties Ltd. x x x x x x 
Swire Pacific Co. Ltd. x x x x x x 
Television Broadcasts Ltd. x x x x x x 
The Wharf (Holdings) Ltd. x x x x x x 
Wheelock and Co. Ltd. x x x x x x 
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APPENDIX III 
SAMPLE COMPANIES SELECTED FROM THE HANG SENG CHINA-AFFILIATED 
CORPORATIONS INDEX CONSTITUENT STOCK 
\m im m^ \m mi 
Beijing Development (HK) Ltd. x 
Beijing Enterprises Holdings Ltd. x 
CASIL Telecommunications Holdings Ltd. x 
China Aerospace International Holdings Ltd. x x x x x x 
China Everbright International Ltd. x x x x x x 
China Everbright Ltd. x x 
China Everbright Technology Ltd. x x 
China Foods Holdings Ltd. x x x x x x 
China Merchants Holdings (International) Co. Ltd. x x x x x x 
China Overseas Land & Investment Ltd. x x x x x x 
China Pharmaceutical Enterprise & Investment 
Corporation Ltd. x x x x x 
China Resources Beijing Land Ltd. x 
China Resources Enterprises Ltd. x x x x x x 
China Travel International Investment Hong 
Kong Ltd. X X X X X X 
Chu Kong Shipping Development Co. Ltd. x 
CNPC (Hong Kong) Ltd. x x x x x 
Continental Mariner Investment Co. Ltd. x x x x x x 
COSCO International Holdings Ltd. x 
COSCO Pacific Ltd. x x x x x 
Denway Investment Ltd. x x x x x x 
Founder (Hong Kong) Ltd. x x x x 
GITIC Enterprises Ltd. x 
Guangdong Brewery Holdings Ltd. x 
Guangdong Investment Ltd. x x x x x x 
Guangdong Tannery Ltd. x 
Guangnan (Holdings) Ltd. x x x x x 
Guangzhou Investment Co. Ltd. x x x x x x 
GZI Transport Ltd. x 
GZITIC Hualing Holdings Ltd. x x x x x x 
Legend Holdings Ltd. x x x x x 
Min Xin Holdings Ltd. x x 
Ng Fung Hong Ltd. x x x x 
ONFEM Holdings Ltd. x x x x x x 
Poly Investments Holdings Ltd. x x x x x x 
Shanghai Industrial Holdings Ltd. x x x 
Shenyin Wanguo (HK) Ltd. x x x x x x 
Shenzhen International Holdings Ltd. x x 
Shougang Concord Century Holding Ltd. x x x x x x 
Shougang Concord International Enterprises Co. Ltd. x x x x x x 
Shougang Concord Technology Holdings Ltd. x x x x x 
, Shougang Concord Grand Ltd. x x x x x x 
Shum Yip Investment Ltd. x 
Stone Electronic Technology Ltd. x x x x x x 
Top Glory International Holdings Ltd. x x x x x x 
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APPENDIX III 
SAMPLE COMPANIES SELECTED FROM THE HANG SENG CHINA-AFFILIATED 
CORPORATIONS INDEX CONSTITUENT STOCK 
• 歷 • m s • im 
Angang New Steel Co. Ltd. x x 
Anhui Conch Cement Co. Ltd. x x 
Anhui Expressay Co. Ltd. x x x 
Beijing Datang Power Generation Co. Ltd. x x 
Beijing North Star Co. Ltd. x x 
Beijing Yanhua Petrochemical Co. Ltd. x x 
Beiren Printing Machinery Holdings Ltd. x x x x x x 
CATIC Shenzhen Holdings Ltd. x x 
Chengdu Telecommunications Cable Co. Ltd. x x x x x 
China Eastern Airlines Corporation Ltd. x x 
China Shipping Development Co. Ltd. x x x x x 
China Southern Airlines Co. Ltd. x x 
Chongqing Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. x x 
Dongfang Electrical Machinery Co. Ltd. x x x x x 
First Tractor Co. Ltd. x x 
Guangdong Kelon Electrical Holdings Co. Ltd. x x x 
Guangshen Railway Co. Ltd. x x x 
Guangzhou Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. x x 
Guangzhou Shipyard International Co. Ltd. x x x x x x 
Harbin Power Equipment Co. Ltd. x x x x x 
Huaneng Power International, Inc. x 
Jiangsu Expressway Co. Ltd. x x 
Jiangxi Copper Co. Ltd. x x 
Jilin Chemical Industrial Co. Ltd. x x x x 
Jingwei Textile Machinery Co. Ltd. x x x 
Kunming Machine Tool Co. Ltd. x x x x x x 
Luoyang Glass Co. Ltd. x x x x x 
Maanshan Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. x x x x x x 
Nanjing Panda Electronics Co. Ltd. x x x 
Northeast electrical Transmission & Transformation 
Machinery Manufacturing Co. Ltd. x x x x 
Qingling Motors Co. Ltd. x x x x x 
Shangdong Xinhua Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. x x x 
Shanghai Petrochemical Co. Ltd. x x x x x x 
Shenzhen Expressway Co. Ltd. x x 
Sichuan Expressway Co. Ltd. x x 
Tianjin Bohai Chemical Industry (Group) Co. Ltd. x x x x x 
Tsingtao Brewery Co. Ltd. x x x x x x 
Yanzhou Coal Mining Co. Ltd. x 
Yizheng Chemical Fibre Co. Ltd. x x x x x 
Zhejiang Expressway Co. Ltd. x x 
Zhenhai Refining & Chemical Co. Ltd. x x x x x 
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